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Abstract –Spatial structure has a profound effect on the outcome of evolutionary games. In
the ultimatum game, it leads to the dominance of much fairer players than those predicted to
evolve in well-mixed settings. Here we show that spatiality leads to fair ultimatums only if the
intervals from which the players are able to choose how much to offer and how little to accept
are sufficiently fine-grained. Small sets of discrete strategies lead to the stable coexistence of the
two most rational strategies in the set, while larger sets lead to the dominance of a single yet not
necessarily the fairest strategy. The fairest outcome is obtained for the most accurate strategy
imitation, that is in the limit of a continuous strategy set. Having a multitude of choices is thus
crucial for the evolution of fairness, but not necessary for the evolution of empathy.
After having discovered the conflict between individ-
ual and common interests that emerges amongst selfish
agents, which today is widely known as the prisoner’s
dilemma, Merrill Flood asked his colleagues how they
would share the profit of the second-hand dealer when di-
rectly buying a car from each other [1]. It turned out that
the majority seller-buyer pairs agreed on a fair split. This
characteristic human behavior outlines how social dilem-
mas could be resolved.
The ultimatum game was proposed by Gu¨th et al. [2]
with the aim of studying the experimental outcome of ul-
timatum bargaining. In addition to the traditional goal
of bargaining, which is to solve a distribution problem
between the involved parties [3], ultimatum bargaining
concerns the case where one party can restrict the set of
possible agreements to a single proposal with which the
other party can either agree or not. Besides the many
applications in experimental economics, there is a rapidly
growing interest in the ultimatum game stemming from
many different fields of research, which is fueled by the
game’s fascinating ability to capture the most fundamen-
tal aspects of sharing that takes place in the absence of
contracts and regulatory institutions [4]. The rules of the
game can be laid down with just a couple of sentences.
Imagine two players having to share a sum of money. One
proposes a split, and the other can either agree with it
or not. No haggling is allowed. If there is an agreement,
the sum is shared according to the proposal. If not, both
players remain empty handed.
Similarly simple as the rules of the ultimatum game is
the decision each rational proposer ought to make, which
is to claim the large majority of the sum, given that the
responder ought to accept even the smallest amount of-
fered as otherwise she would receive nothing. This sce-
nario is indeed predicted by theoretical economics under
the assumption that each individual is fully rational and
focused only on maximizing its own profit. Experiments,
however, reveal a different reality. Largely regardless of
sex, age and the amount of money at stake, people refuse
to accept offers they perceive as too small [5–11]. Offers
below one third of the total amount are rejected as of-
ten as they are accepted, and not surprisingly, more than
two thirds of all offers will be remarkably close to the fair
50:50 split. It thus turns out that humans are remarkably
fond of fair play, regardless of whether it is enforced with
contracts and regulations or not [4]. The question is why?
There is psychological evidence suggesting that the util-
ity functions based on which we determine our satisfaction
are not simply the reflections of our own profits, but the
profits of others as well [12,13]. While it is not completely
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clear how we weight them, the origins of such behavior
might stem from the fact that we want to be members
of strong groups, on which we can rely on for protection
and help with rearing offspring [14, 15]. This is of course
impossible if we don’t share our rewards equally with the
other members of the group. An altogether different ex-
planation is that we offer equal shares because we fail to
reap the benefits of a one-off encounter. Put differently,
we fail to “seize the moment” although it should be clear
to us that the probability of another encounter with the
same player is minute [16].
Similarly to previous observations concerning social
dilemmas [17–25], theoretical works have emphasized the
importance of reputation [26], empathy [27, 28], spatial
structure [29–32], and heterogeneity [33, 34] for the suc-
cessful evolution of fairness. In particular, Page et al.
[29] have shown that in well-mixed populations natural
selection favors the rational solution, while spatiality may
lead to much fairer outcomes. This result has been tested
thoroughly against different types of players and updating
rules [31], on various interaction networks [35–39], as well
as under coevolution [40].
Here we depart from the traditionally studied version
of the ultimatum game by no longer considering the unit
intervals from where the players choose their offer level p
and acceptance level q to be continuous, but rather, we
consider both intervals to be coarse grained. The inset of
Fig. 1 depicts such a setup schematically if the number of
intervals along p and q is equal to N = 5. In [41], we have
introduced and studied a similar variant of the ultimatum
game, yet with an imposed p = q constraint and an in-
vading strategy in order to reveal the fascinatingly rich
dynamical behavior that underlies human bargaining. It
encompasses mixed stationary states and traveling waves,
as well the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance,
which we have shown to be a consequence of pattern for-
mation. In this letter, however, we focus on the survivabil-
ity of strategies in the complete p−q plane with the aim of
determining the impact of a finite number of choices when
possing the ultimatum.
Initially, we thus have N2 strategies Ei,j , where i, j =
0, 1, . . . , N − 1, that are distributed uniformly at random
on a L×L square lattice. Each player on site x is assigned
a (px, qx) pair that corresponds to its strategy Ei,j such
that px = (r1 + i)/N and qx = (r2 + j)/N , where the two
real random numbers (r1, r2) ∈ [0, 1) are drawn indepen-
dently for the creation of each Ei,j . The evolution of the
initial strategy distribution is performed by repeating the
following elementary steps in accordance with the Monte
Carlo simulation procedure. First, a randomly selected
player x acquires its payoff Ux by playing the ultimatum
game with its four nearest neighbors, whereby during each
pairwise interaction acting once as a proposer with px and
once as a responder with qx, according to its Ei,j strategy.
Next, a randomly chosen neighbor y with strategy Ei′,j′
also acquires its payoff Uy in the same way. Lastly, player
x tries to enforce its Ei,j strategy on player y in accordance
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Fig. 1: Time evolution of the fraction of strategies as obtained
for N = 5 and L = 400. The surviving strategies, i = j =
0 and i = j + 1 = 1, are marked by red (solid) and green
(dashed) lines. Inset shows the schematic presentation of the
coarse-grained p− q strategy plane for N ×N = 52 strategies.
Crosses mark the two coexisting strategy cells that survive the
evolutionary process in this particular case.
with the probability w = {1+exp[(Uy−Ux)/K]}
−1, where
K quantifies the uncertainty during the strategy adoption
process. We emphasize that the adoption of a new strat-
egy is possible only if i 6= i′ and/or j 6= j′. Furthermore,
during the imitation of a strategy Ei,j (i, j = 0, . . . , N−1)
two new independent random numbers (r1 and r2) are gen-
erated for the corresponding value of py and qy in order
to take into account the role of mutation, which was also
considered in the continuous ultimatum game [26].
There is another advantage to using the adoption of
(i, j) indices rather than copying the (px, qx) values accu-
rately. In the latter case, it might happen that the final
state will depend on the finite number of choices when pos-
ing the ultimatum, especially at small system size when
only a limited set of (p, q) values is available. To generate
new (px, qx) values after strategy adoption, however, di-
minishes the fortuity of the initial state while preserving
the course of strategy evolution. We also note that our
analysis is restricted only to odd values of N (from N = 3
to 321), which ensures that the fair p = q = 0.5 pair is
positioned in the center of the strategy i = j = (N −1)/2.
In this way, artifacts related to the coexistence of neigh-
boring strategies along the p = q = 0.5 border can be
avoided.
During the evolutionary process the time is measured in
Monte Carlo steps (MCS). During one MCS each player
has a chance once on average to change its strategy. For
the systematic numerical analysis, we have determined the
fraction of strategies in the final stationary state when
varying the coarse graining N at a fixed noise level (K =
0.1). To ensure an adequate accuracy, we have used L =
200−1600, and we have averaged the final state over 102−
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Fig. 2: Characteristic spatial distributions of the two surviving
strategies i = j = 0 (red) and i = j + 1 = 1 (green) for N = 3
(left) and N = 5 (right) in the stationary state. While for
N = 3 the less rational players are forced into small isolated
clusters, for N = 5 the distribution of space on the square
lattice is practically even.
104 independent runs.
Before presenting the main results, we briefly survey the
outcome of the game under well-mixed conditions. In this
case, starting from a random distribution, only the strat-
egy cells which fulfill p < 0.5 and q > 0.5 will survive.
These cells are neutrally stable because none of the of-
fers will be accepted. Accordingly, the system is subject
to random drift that results in a fixation to one of the
mentioned strategies in a finite population.
Using a spatial system, we first present the outcome of
the evolutionary process for N = 3 and N = 5. Figure 1
features the time evolution of the fraction of strategies for
N = 5 (qualitatively similar behavior can be observed for
N = 3). In both cases only two strategies (i = j = 0 and
i = j + 1 = 1) survive and coexist. They represent the
two most rational options from the available set, both in
terms of the offer and the acceptance level. However, while
for N = 3 the i = j = 0 strategy clearly dominates, for
N = 5 the two strategies share the square lattice almost
equally. This is further confirmed by results presented in
Fig. 2, where it can be observed that for N = 3 (left) the
i = j + 1 = 1 players (green) survive by forming compact
isolated clusters, which protects them against the inva-
sion of the more rational players adopting the i = j = 0
strategy (red). For N = 5 (right), on the other hand, the
characteristic snapshot in the stationary state reflects the
equality of power of the two remaining strategies. The
trend, being that for larger N the i = j + 1 strategy be-
comes superior, is indicative of the results for N > 5 that
we present next.
The time evolution of strategies changes dramatically
if we increase N . Then the system fixates into a homo-
geneous state where only a single Ei,j strategy remains
alive. Figure 3 features the time evolution of the fraction
of the only surviving strategy for several different values
of N , as indicated in the legend. The upper inset reveals
how the lastly dominating strategy acquires superiority
over the two most persistent opponents. In general, the
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Fig. 3: Time evolution of the fraction of the single surviving
strategy for different values of N > 5 (see legend) and L = 800.
Upper inset shows the time evolution of the three strategies
competing the longest, as obtained for N = 41 and L = 400.
As an illustration of how the fixation time fluctuates, the lower
inset shows the probability distribution of the fixation time τ ,
as obtained for N = 81 and L = 200, and averaged over 104
independent realizations of the game.
larger the N the longer the relaxation towards the station-
ary state, although it is worth noting that the individual
fixation times fluctuate heavily even for large L. This is
illustrated in the lower inset of Fig. 3, where the probabil-
ity distribution of individual fixation times P (τ) is plotted
for N = 81 and L = 200. Here the average fixation time is
31290 MCS and the variance is 81140 MCS. Qualitatively
similar large fluctuations are characteristic also for other
values of N and L.
In order to obtain a better understanding of the selec-
tion process leading to the dominance of a single strategy,
it is instructive to examine the evolution of the strategy
distribution over time. Figure 4 displays this process for
N = 41 and L = 400. In the earliest stages of the game,
a substantial number of strategies (for example q > p,
p > 0.5 and q > 0.5) die out fast, as illustrated in panels
(a) and (b). It is interesting to note that this evolution is
in stark contrast to the well-mixed case where strategies
from the upper-left region of the p− q plane remain alive.
After the extensive decrease in the number of surviving
strategies, mainly the empathetic ones (p ≈ q) survive
and continue the competition [see panel (c)]. It is within
this part of the evolutionary process that the potential
winners (strategies with the higher frequency) exchange
consecutively, until finally only one strategy prevails [see
panel (d)].
Although at certain stages of the game a strategy may
appear as the likely winner, the latter still cannot be fore-
told conclusively. As indicated by the distribution pre-
sented in panel (d), one strategy finally emerges as the
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Fig. 4: Time evolution of the strategy distribution after 5 (a),
50 (b), 5000 (c) and 12000 (d) MCS, as obtained for N = 41
and L = 400. First the strategies characterized by q > p
become extinct [see panel (a)]. It quickly comes down to de-
termining the victor amongst those strategies that are charac-
terized by p ≈ q < 0.5 [see panel (b)]. As the evolutionary
process matures, only a few of these strategies remain in the
system [see panel (c)], upon which lastly a single one survives
[see panel (d)].
victor and occupies the whole lattice (ρ = 1). Interest-
ingly however, having a closer look at the time evolution
of the density of specific strategies at any given N reveals
that, during the early stages of the game, several other
strategies may occupy a significantly larger portion of the
lattice than the strategy that will eventually rise to com-
plete dominance (results not shown). This suggests that
the victorious strategy is unable to invade the whole pop-
ulation at once, but rather that its dominance emerges as
a results of an intricate battle between different strategy
pairs that cancel each other out beforehand. The battle
of initially successful strategies is illustrated in the upper
inset of Fig. 3. Revealing such a scenario is possible ex-
clusively due to the consideration of a finite number of
competing strategies, which in turn further supports the
important role of local strategy patterns for the outcome
of the spatial ultimatum game [41].
The final destination can be different even at the same
N , yet the difference between i and j is always small,
rarely exceeding 2, and this only for very large N . In
the majority of cases the victorious strategies differ in de-
pendence on N as follows: i = j + 1 = 3 at N = 11,
i = j + 1 = 8 at N = 21, i = j + 1 = 18 at N = 41,
i = j +1 = 37 at N = 81, and i = j +1 = 76 at N = 161.
These results suggest that the evolution of fairness de-
pends sensitively on the multitude of choices players have
when posing their ultimatums. In particular, the higher
the N the closer the winning strategy will be to the fair
one. The evolution of empathy, on the other hand, is much
less affected by it.
To elaborate on this observation more precisely, we have
averaged the victorious (p, q) pairs in dependence on N .
Results presented in Fig. 5 confirm that the larger the N
the closer the winning strategy is to the fair p ≈ q = 0.5
outcome. It is worth emphasizing, however, that only in
the N → ∞ limit is the fair strategy strictly recoverable.
In practice this may be irrelevant, given that the differ-
ences become negligible as N > 100, and can indeed be
easily attributed to mutation. Nevertheless, results pre-
sented in Fig. 5 attest clearly to the fact that, even if the
interactions amongst players are restricted, the evolution
of fairness requires ample freedom of choice in terms of the
selection of p and q values that determine the individual
offer and acceptance levels. The evolution of empathy, on
the other hand, is much more robust to variations of N ,
given that the fixation points in Fig. 5 all fall predomi-
nantly in the vicinity of the diagonal.
It is worth mentioning that the above analysis was re-
peated also for the case when the mutation during the
strategy adoption was suppressed by choosing r1 = r2 =
0.5 for each imitation. We find that for such a setup the
system reproduces all the reported main results.
Finally, we would like to stress that the observed fixa-
tion to the “almost fair” strategies, as well as the tendency
that their position on the p−q plain approaches the strictly
fair solution as N increases, is not limited to the square
lattice interaction topology. In order to confirm this, we
p-4
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Fig. 5: The average of victorious (p, q) values, as obtained for
different values of N > 5. For comparison, we also plot the
average of surviving strategies for N = 3 and N = 5, where
stable coexistence can be observed. The trace of destinations
shows clearly that the final average (p, q) values converge to
the fair p = q ≈ 0.5 solution as we increase N .
have performed simulations on regular small-world net-
works when ν = 0.1 fraction of the links constituting the
square lattice was rewired to randomly chosen other play-
ers [42, 43]. This modification of the interaction topology
does not affect the main results, indicating that restricted
connections, which are representative for all structured
populations, represent the most distinctive feature that
enables the observations reported in this letter.
In summary, we have studied the spatial ultimatum
game with a discrete set of strategies for two types of
dynamics based on stochastic imitation of a neighboring
strategy. The strategy set included N2 coarse grained
strategies covering equidistantly the whole p − q plane.
We have shown that for low values of N two strategies
can coexist in the stationary state, whereby the survivors
are always the two most rational strategies with the low-
est possible acceptance level q. For larger N only a sin-
gle strategy survives, which is typically characterized by
i = j + 1 = (N − 1)/2. Evidently for large N the p and q
values of the dominant strategy go to 1/2, reflecting that
the victorious strategy is both fair as well as empathetic.
This is significantly different from the mean-field behav-
ior. The quantitative analysis of the evolutionary process
indicates that the strategies with j > i (q > p) die out
quickly, while the strategies with p ≈ q remain alive for a
long time, yet dependent on N . Finally, if N > 5 one of
the p ≈ q strategies emerges as the victor, while for N ≤ 5
we have coexistence as described. Despite of the large size
of the system we have used in our simulations, there is
some uncertainties in the values of p and q (or i and j) for
the victorious strategy, which must be related to the small
differences in the superiority for the given level of noise.
Despite of the mentioned uncertainties, the presented
results indicate clearly that the evolution of fairness is
very sensitive to the accuracy in the strategy imitation,
which in the present model is characterized by the number
of choices the players have for posing their ultimatums.
On the other hand, the evolution of empathy seems to
be much more robust. For the Homo emoticus to shine
through, it hence appears we need to have all the freedom
possible when engaging into ultimatum bargaining. Such
conditions, however, are certainly not always given, which
may be one of the reasons the rational Homo economicus
sometimes gets the best of us. We hope an experimental
test will one day be made to shed further light on the
importance of discrete strategies in the ultimatum game.
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